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Summary 
In this article, we offer an account of the epistemological and moral principles that should 
govern decisions where judges and other official decision-makers are asked to authorize 
courses of action which would amount to a violation of someone’s rights in the absence of 
 justifying circumstances. Our argument is in four sections. In Section I, we outline the 
normative framework for our analysis. We draw on the theory of rights expounded by Alan 
Gewirth and developed by Beyleveld, Brownsword and Pattinson, but rather than relying on 
the reader’s being fully convinced by Gewirth’s argument for the ‘dialectical necessity’ of 
such rights, we suggest an alternative, contractarian defence of Gewirth’s ‘Principle of 
Generic Consistency’ (PGC) as a basis for social co-operation that all reasonable citizens 
could accept. Section II explores the epistemological implications of the principle of public 
justification: specifically, how the knowledge-claims of experts are made cognitively 
accessible to, and open to evaluation by, ordinary citizens. Section III brings together the 
epistemological and moral arguments to set out a framework of ‘rights precautionism’ by 
which non-consensual expert intervention in the lives of citizens can be regulated. Section IV 
illustrates the application of the principles developed in Sections II and III to two fictional 
examples drawn from mental health and capacity law. 
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Introduction 
Judges and other official decision-makers are often asked to authorize courses of action which 
involve an infringement of someone’s rights, i.e. what would amount to a violation of those 
rights in the absence of justifying circumstances. Such interventions are often advocated by 
experts who claim either that no-one’s rights will in fact be violated - for example, because a 
patient lacks decisional competence to refuse medical treatment - or that infringing a person’s 
rights (a justifiable restriction of rights)
1
 is warranted in order to protect more important rights 
of others or themselves - for example, the compulsory detention of a person in a psychiatric 
hospital on the grounds of presenting serious risk of harm to others or oneself. Such acts 
                                                 
1
 Our use of the distinction between infringing and violating a right is taken from Feinberg 1978 and Thomson 
1986. For an interesting critical discussion of this distinction, see Oberdiek 2004. 
 require justification; and if the state claims to be one that can be accepted as legitimate by all 
citizens, the justification must be one that all citizens can rationally accept. It is not enough, 
or so we shall argue, that the infringement of rights be justified from the perspective of some 
group that possesses, or claims to possess, specialized knowledge. Those knowledge-claims 
must be rationally acceptable to citizens in general. 
 
Where the person whose rights are to be invaded (for example by surgery) is a decisionally 
competent adult, the question of justification will typically be reduced to whether informed 
consent has been provided. Just how ‘informed’ the consent should be is debatable (see, for 
example, Beyleveld and Brownsword 2007, pp. 170-183, Manson and O’Neill 2007, chapters 
2 and 3 and McLean 2010, chapter 2), but where the patient has genuinely consented to the 
invasion of her bodily and/or psychological integrity, the public justification of the 
intervention is, generally speaking, a fairly straightforward matter. More difficult questions 
arise where the affected person is, or is alleged to be, incompetent to decide by reason of 
youth, severe mental disorder or intellectual disability, or where a decisionally competent 
person can be detained and treated against her will on the grounds of severe mental disorder. 
These are the cases on which we focus here. 
 
What we offer in this article is an account of the epistemological and moral principles that 
should in our view govern such decisions, rather than any detailed blueprint for legal reform. 
Briefly, we argue for two main principles: 
 
1. A principle of public justification, which we will call ‘rational acceptability’, which 
requires decisions that impinge upon citizens’ rights to be justified in terms that 
citizens in general and where possible, the particular citizen directly affected) can 
rationally accept; and 
2. A moral heuristic which we call ‘rights-precautionism’, which requires that when an 
error in one direction on a question of fact (e.g. determining that a person is 
incompetent to make a particular decision when in fact she is competent) is more 
likely to lead to a violation of rights than an error in the other direction, there should 
be a strong presumption in favour of the view which, if erroneous, will lead to the 
lesser violation of rights. The level of evidence required for this will depend on the 
probability of serious of the respective violations. 
 
Our argument in this article is in four sections. In Section I, we outline the normative 
framework for our analysis. We draw on the theory of rights expounded by Alan Gewirth and 
developed by Gewirthian legal philosophers Beyleveld, Brownsword and Pattinson, but rather 
than relying on the reader’s being fully convinced by Gewirth’s argument for the ‘dialectical 
necessity’ of such rights, we suggest an alternative, contractarian defence of Gewirth’s 
‘Principle of Generic Consistency’ (PGC) as a basis for social co-operation that all reasonable 
citizens could accept. In our view, the PGC as developed by Beyleveld et al. provides the best 
analysis of the rights of severely mentally disordered and intellectually disabled adults (see, in 
particular, Beyleveld 2012, Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000 and 2010, and Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001, as well as Bielby 2008). Section II explores the epistemological 
implications of the principle of public justification: specifically, how the knowledge-claims of 
experts are made cognitively accessible to, and open to evaluation by, ordinary citizens. 
Section III brings together the epistemological and moral arguments to set out a framework of 
 ‘rights precautionism’ by which non-consensual expert intervention in the lives of citizens 
can be regulated. Section IV illustrates the application of the principles developed in Sections 
II and III to two fictional examples drawn from mental health and capacity law. 
 
With the exception of the final section, our discussion in this paper is pitched almost entirely 
at the level of general principles. Anyone familiar with the way decisions about competence 
and compulsory treatment are actually made will recognize that there is a wide gap between 
the position we defend and current medico-legal reality (for a good example of the current 
reality, see Peay 2003). We do not believe that the normative argument we advance in this 
paper, however, is so far-fetched that it could not provide a basis for practical prescriptions 
for reform. Nonetheless, we must leave detailed consideration of that gap and the institutional 
changes that would be required to close it for another day. 
 
I. Rational Acceptability: (i) Moral acceptability 
The two principles we propose draw from two strands within a broadly Kantian approach to 
ethics and political philosophy, those of Gewirthian ethics (see, seminally, Gewirth 1978) and 
contractualism (again, see seminally, Rawls 1993, Rawls 1999 and Scanlon 1998 as well as 
the overview in Darwall 2003). The combination of the two gives us a picture of deliberative 
bodies constrained by a strong framework of rights. Our starting point is the widely held view 
in democratic theory, which we endorse, that the state must justify its use of coercive power 
in terms that all reasonable citizens could rationally accept (epitomised by Rawls 1993, 
Habermas 1990 and Estlund 2008). Rational acceptability has two elements: the normative 
grounds for coercion must be morally acceptable, and the factual grounds on which a norm is 
held to apply to a particular situation must be cognitively accessible to citizens in general, so 
that citizens can know that the situation is one in which coercion is authorized in accordance 
with the norm. We shall discuss moral acceptability in this section and cognitive accessibility 
in the next. 
 
Our central claim is that no rational citizen would consent to their human rights, properly 
understood as protecting extremely important interests, being invaded without very good 
reasons that she could understand.
2
 Evidently, not all citizens are rational all the time, and 
when significant departures from this standard occur that risk harmful consequences for 
others and occasionally unintended harmful consequences for self, we sometimes must invade 
citizens’ rights without their consent, either because this is refused or because they are 
incapable of offering consent or refusal at the material time. 
 
                                                 
2
 For reasons we will go on to discuss, we take those principles to include most of the rights on standard lists of 
human rights, including civil, economic and social rights as well as basic liberties. In terms of international law, 
would take us beyond the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) to those given 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Of course, this only gives an idea of the scope of the rights we 
would endorse – the ways in which we think they ought to be implemented may not be clear on the face of these 
instruments, which, like the existence of the rights themselves, would require independent moral justification for 
their force. 
 In addition, of course, rational citizens can reasonably disagree. Even if one accepts, as we do, 
that there are substantive moral principles that all rational citizens must endorse, any plausible 
theory will still leave scope for highly significant disagreements (see, for example, Beyleveld 
and Brownsword 2006). How can legitimate decisions be reached in the face of such 
disagreements? A standard liberal answer is that they are legitimate if they are made  
 
“in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable 
to their common human reason.” (Rawls 1993, p 137). 
 
These “constitutional essentials” (Rawls ibid., p 137) include not only procedural 
arrangements but also a framework of rights, since reasonable citizens cannot be expected to 
agree to a ‘tyranny of the majority’. And, what is particularly pertinent to our argument, an 
adequate framework of rights must include some principles to guide decision-making when 
rights conflict or their application is unclear. If all reasonable citizens accept a decision-
making body as legitimate, they cannot reasonably deny that its decisions should be followed, 
even if they reasonably regard some of its decisions as wrong (Estlund 2008, p 49). 
 
At this stage, it is important to clarify what we mean by ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’. In recent 
years, liberal political theory has sought to distinguish the two, epitomised in Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism. Rawls claims that a reasonable person is “ready to propose principles 
and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance 
that others do so” (Rawls 1993, p 49) whereas a rational person is “a single unified agent . . . 
with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its 
own” (Rawls ibid., p 50). For Rawls, “there is no thought of deriving the one from the other” 
(Rawls ibid., p 51). Some other philosophers, notably Alan Gewirth, take the view that the 
reasonable can indeed be derived from the rational: that to recognise one’s own right to the 
freedom and well-being that make successful agency possible while denying that others have 
rights to those necessary goods as well is self-contradictory (Gewirth, 1983 p 244). We need 
not resolve the precise relationship between the reasonable and the rational here, though we 
may at least understand the latter as a function of the former. What we do claim is that, 
whether reasonableness is strictly entailed by rationality or adds something to it, rational 
citizens who deliberated about the moral and political framework of their society would 
necessarily endorse a supreme principle of moral and political rights on the lines of Alan 
Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency: the principle of respecting the rights of others as 
well as of oneself to the ‘generic conditions’ or ‘generic features’ of agency (the seminal 
statement of this argument is in Gewirth 1978, with a detailed reconstruction and defence in 
Beyleveld 1991). That is to say, they would agree that each citizen had rights to the elements 
of freedom and well-being that constitute the generic conditions of agency, i.e. action in 
pursuit of freely chosen purposes (see Gewirth 1982, especially at pp. 46-47 and pp. 52-53.). 
These rights comprise not only negative rights, for example to freedom from interference with 
bodily integrity, but positive rights to receive assistance from one’s fellow-citizens (delivered 
in practice through a state), for example, to mental and physical care. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to defend that principle in detail, though below we indicate two ways in which the 
justification of rights might proceed – one which is dialectical necessary and another which is 
related to the acceptance of rights on grounds more familiar with contractarianism. 
 
 Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument for the PGC involves three main stages 
(Beyleveld 1991, pp. 13-14 and pp. 21-46), which he claims must be accepted by anyone who 
acts for voluntary purposes of any kind. This proceeds from the first person standpoint of the 
agent. In stage (1), the agent recognises that she must necessarily have the ‘generic 
conditions’ of agency - freedom and well-being - which are the core features of any purposive 
action whatsoever, in order to be able to fulfil her particular purposes (whatever these may be) 
with any chance of success. Freedom and well-being include both needs for absence of 
interference and assistance, such as freedom from external constraint and adequate levels of 
shelter, nutrition and mental stability to facilitate the pursuit of her chosen goals (see Gewirth 
1978, pp. 22-63). In stage (2), the agent claims that she has these rights to freedom and well-
being simply by virtue of being an agent (known as “the Argument from the Sufficiency of 
Agency” (Gewirth ibid., p 110)) and recognises that she contradicts herself as an agent if she 
tries to justify her having the generic rights on any other criterion (see Gewirth ibid., pp. 63-
103 and also Beyleveld 1991, pp. 23-42).
3
 In stage (3), the agent moves from prudential to 
moral reasoning through universalizing these rights-claims: she accepts that since she has 
rights to freedom and well-being simply by virtue of being a agent, the same is true of all 
other agents by applying the ‘”logical principle of universalizability” (see Beyleveld 1991 p 
44 and Gewirth 1978, esp. pp. 104-106). This leads to a categorical prescription for moral 
action, which is the essence of the PGC “Act in accord with the generic rights of your 
recipients as well as of yourself [emphasis in original]” (Gewirth ibid., p 135). 
 
The controversy about Gewirth’s theory mainly concerns whether he can demonstrate a 
strictly logical progression from stages (1) to (2) to (3). As Beyleveld (2012) notes, stage (1) 
is relatively uncontroversial (but for an important criticism targeting stage (1), see Regan 
1999). Many commentators, however (including one of the present authors) remain 
unpersuaded by stage (2). For the purposes of this article, we take an agnostic stance as to 
whether Gewirth’s argument succeeds on its own dialectically necessary terms. (One of us 
(PB) believes it does, the other (TW) does not.)  Irrespective of whether or not an agent is 
compelled to make those moves as a matter of rational necessity, we submit that a reasonable 
agent – one who is motivated to seek and abide by fair terms of social co-operation – would 
do so. In other words, we claim that it follows from Stage (1) that she could not rationally 
agree to political arrangements that would deny her those rights (unless she were willing to 
compromise her capacity for agency to some degree - for the qualification, see Beyleveld 
2012, though we need not consider here what arrangements might be accepted by people who 
do accept significant limitations on their own agency, e.g. for religious reasons). A fortiori she 
could reasonably reject such arrangements
4
. This approach is influenced by the idea of “the 
reasonable self”, developed by Gewirth (1988 p 144), in which the rational reflection that 
being reasonable entails takes precedence “over egoistic or particularistic rationality” 
(Gewirth 1983 p 244). Recognising her own needs for freedom and well-being and those of 
others, she would accept the creation of a system of mutually recognised rights to freedom 
and well-being. Being reasonable (in the Rawlsian sense (1993 p 49)), she would also be 
                                                 
3
 To couch the need for freedom and well-being in terms any less forceful than a right would be to diminish the 
necessity of claiming freedom and well-being to any purpose we may wish to pursue (Beyleveld 1991 pp. 97-
98). Agents are “logically required to be opposed to such interference” with their rights (ibid., p 97), a claim 
which is supported by “the argument from attitudinal consistency” (ibid., pp. 95-101). 
4
 For Scanlon’s view, see Scanlon 1982, p 112: “it is the reasonableness of rejecting a principle, rather than the 
reasonableness of accepting it, on which moral argument turns.” 
 disposed to support even those rights that were irrelevant to her particular position and chosen 
purposes. If one grants that legitimate political arrangements must be rationally acceptable to 
all citizens, it follows that legitimate political arrangements must enshrine the rights that flow 
from the PGC.
5
 Even if one wishes to contend that the universalization of agency rights which 
occurs at stage (3) of the argument is a move the agent could rationally deny, it is a move 
which all moral theories that incorporate a notion of equal treatment based upon a principle of 
relevant similarity require (or assume) the moral actor to make (for a defence of this principle, 
see Levvis 1991).
6
 In this respect, Gewirth’s argument is not susceptible to any greater 
objection than any other position in moral philosophy (and if the dialectically necessary 
method is successful, it is superior to one that appeals to a standard of reasonableness 
independent of rationality
7
). 
 
We have set out this argument as concisely as we can because it is not the purpose of this 
article to develop or defend the first principles of a substantive moral or political theory. 
Rather, we have sought to offer plausible grounds for the moral acceptability limb of the 
principle of rational acceptability that we argue should govern the use of expert evidence in 
decisions affecting rights (the second limb, that of ‘cognitively accessibility’ we will turn to 
next). In setting out our stall – which behoves any normative argument - we aim merely to 
demonstrate that our core premises are not tied to one particular theory, and are less 
controversial than might be thought had they have been grounded in Gewirth’s dialectically 
necessary method alone. Since we cannot pursue these meta-ethical questions any further in a 
short paper, we are willing to accept that readers who are unmoved by our conception of 
reasonableness (or are not among the admittedly small number of those convinced by 
Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument), will probably dissent from at least some of what 
follows.
8
 
 
II. Rational acceptability: (ii) Cognitive accessibility 
It is a fundamental democratic principle that the exercise of state power must be justified in 
terms that citizens can understand. This does not mean that, where the purported justification 
for an exercise of power depends on an expert’s opinion, the citizen has to understand every 
                                                 
5
 For instance, a reasonable person who has enough wealth to remain financially self-sufficient for the rest of her 
life and who does not wish to have children would recognise the moral force of contributing to a progressive 
system of wealth taxation (e.g. on her income or the value of her home) at a high level to fund expansive social 
welfare provision and would accept that a share of these funds should be channelled into activities such as family 
support schemes (e.g. ‘Sure Start’ programmes in the UK) and infertility treatments. 
6
 Gewirth and his followers have been criticised for adopting an unduly ‘monological’ approach to moral and 
political reasoning (see, for example, La Torre 2006). In our view, adopting a more ‘dialogical’ approach, in 
which we consider not what an agent would accept in solitary reflection but what she could reasonably accept in 
seeking to reach agreement with others, does not undermine the PGC but rather provides a different route to the 
same conclusion. The view that citizens engaged in rational discussion must accept a framework of rights is one 
that we share with Habermas – indeed, Habermas hints at such an argument (Habermas 1990, p 101). 
7
 We refer readers interested in an analysis of the dialectical necessity of the PGC to Beyleveld 1991 and for a 
discussion of the dialectally contingent approach to Beyleveld 1996. 
8
 In any case, from the perspective of English law at least, the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 commit the English courts to a set of rights not dissimilar to those derived from the 
PGC. What is important is that such rights are interpreted as moral rights derived from the needs of agency, and 
not as inconvenient legal barriers to politically-calculated decision-making. 
 detail of the expert’s reasoning. Rather, it means that the citizen must have good reason to 
believe the expert’s conclusions. As Gutmann and Thompson put it: 
 
“Citizens are justified in relying on experts if they describe the basis for their 
conclusions in ways that citizens can understand; and if the citizens have some 
independent basis for believing the experts to be trustworthy (such as a past record of 
reliable judgments, or a decision-making structure that contains checks and balances 
by experts who have reason to exercise critical scrutiny over one another).” (Gutmann 
and Thompson 2004, p. 5.) 
 
Although this is on the right lines, it raises the difficulty that a completely independent basis 
for believing the experts to be trustworthy may be difficult to come by. For example, if we 
look for evidence that the medical profession has a past record of reliable judgments, we are 
likely to find it in research conducted by members of the same profession. And few citizens 
outside any particular group of experts can have a detailed first-hand knowledge of that 
profession’s decision-making structure. So we are thrown back either on the testimony of the 
experts themselves or of some group of meta-experts such as sociologists of medicine - and 
why should we trust them? The difficulty of finding solid ground for our judgments of 
trustworthiness does not arise only in our dealings with experts: it is a fundamental issue in 
the epistemology of testimony (see, for example, Coady 1992, pp. 46-47, Lehrer 2006 and 
Foley, 2001). If we did not start with some predisposition to believe that people who tell us 
things are trustworthy more often than not, our epistemic predicament would be dire (the 
classic defence of this view is offered by Reid: see Coady 2004). To some extent, experts 
have to be trusted to tell the truth about the matters from which they invite us to infer the 
reliability of their judgments - trusted not qua experts, but simply as responsible human 
beings. In any case, these issues are of more theoretical than practical interest in the context of 
institutional structures that are built on the assumption that professions such as medicine, 
psychiatry and social work are at least somewhat trustworthy. 
 
The really difficult question is not whether citizens are justified in having some degree of trust 
in experts, but rather what degree of trust is appropriate when the rights of fellow-citizens are 
at stake. On the approach we advocate here, professionals should be required to satisfy some 
independent tribunal that the publicly accessible reasons for the proposed course of action 
justify an infringement of the patient's rights. Almost invariably, the publicly accessible 
reasons will be something less than the full range of reasons considered by the professionals. 
Professionals will rely to some extent on ‘tacit knowledge’, that is, on judgments for which 
they cannot fully articulate the reasons (Polyani 1983). They will also rely on scientific 
knowledge for which they cannot be expected to articulate the complete body of justificatory 
evidence and reasoning; indeed they will often not know this themselves, having accepted the 
knowledge from other experts. Experts will necessarily be selective in what they tell decision 
makers: they cannot recount every moment and every nuance of a conversation with a patient, 
for example. The decision-maker has to decide whether these reasons, together with the 
general reasons to regard the expert as a reliable assessor of the matter in question, are 
sufficient to justify authorising the proposed rights infringement. In other words, do the 
publicly accessible reasons, including the publicly accessible reasons to believe that the 
expert has good reasons that are not publicly accessible, suffice to justify the infringement? 
In this situation the decision-maker will often be justified in according a degree of epistemic 
 or theoretical authority to the expert. The decision-maker is not as well placed as the expert to 
weigh up all the factors considered by the expert. Thus, if the decision-maker has good 
reasons to trust the expert, she may well have good reasons to accept the expert’s assessment 
of the balance of reasons rather than attempting to weigh up the reasons independently. To 
this extent, judicial deference to expert opinion may appear inevitable. 
 
What we are dealing with here, however, are situations in which the decision-maker is 
concerned not simply to maximise the chances of forming true beliefs, but with adopting a 
basis for decision that minimises the risk of violating another person’s rights. Such a situation 
sets up a complex interplay between epistemic and moral reasons. Even if a decision-maker is 
justified in believing that an expert is more likely than she is to arrive at a correct view of 
whether a patient is decisionally competent, poses a genuine risk of harm to others or has any 
conscious experience, it by no means follows that the decision-maker is justified in accepting 
that conclusion for practical purposes, given the momentous ethical and legal issues at stake. 
This point is a familiar one in the context of criminal justice. Perhaps it is the case that the 
police are better placed than jurors to arrive at sound beliefs about the identity of criminals. 
But even a jury that accepted that view would not be justified in convicting a defendant unless 
they could be sure on the basis of the evidence presented to them that the defendant was 
guilty. 
 
In certain respects, the epistemic or theoretical authority parallels the practical authority of 
law-makers as analysed by Raz. Raz himself has explored this parallel in a number of writings 
(most importantly in Raz 1986 pp. 52-53 and Raz 2009 pp. 154-158). In both cases the 
authority should reach a conclusion based on the same reasons that would lead the deferring 
party to a sound belief or decision if she had access to those reasons and weighed them 
correctly. In both cases the authority’s better access to the reasons gives the other party a 
reason to defer to his judgment. The difference is that in the case of practical authority, one 
who defers to the authority’s judgment cannot consistently do anything except act as directed, 
unless there are reasons not considered by the authority that defeat the directive. By contrast, 
someone who accepts another party as an epistemic authority on some matter has a number of 
options open to her. She may fully believe the authority. She may believe the authority but 
with less than complete confidence, given that her reasons to believe the authority’s 
conclusions can only be as strong as her reasons to trust the authority. She may suspend 
judgment, since she may believe the authority is more likely to be right than she without 
forming a positive belief that the authority is right. She may accept what the authority says for 
practical purposes without believing it; or she may believe it (with less than full confidence) 
but nevertheless accept the contrary proposition for contrary purposes, as a jury may acquit a 
defendant they believe to be guilty but not to the extent of being sure. Reliance on expert 
authority, then, is not inconsistent with the independent exercise of reasoning by the citizen. 
On the contrary, deference to expert authority, when it is justified by critical examination of 
the grounds for that authority, greatly extends the range of matters on which the citizen can 
form rational beliefs. 
 
Reliance on authority, however, is only one way of using expert opinion. In many cases the 
citizen can and should understand the expert’s reasoning rather than deferring to her 
conclusions. This particularly true in two types of case that are relevant to our present 
concerns. One is moral or ethical expertise. Perhaps the most obvious example of an ‘ethics 
 expert’ is an individual conversant in medical ethics who is appointed to sit on a hospital 
ethics committee (e.g. a clinical bioethicist) or an academic philosopher undertaking research 
and teaching in a university. In such cases, we agree with Varelius that expertise in ethics can 
exist and that it is analogous to other roles and professions about which we can plausibly 
speak of the presence of expertise (Varelius 2008). However, this amounts to only one 
possible sense of expertise in ethics. 
 
There are several different kinds of moral expertise (see Weinstein 1994), but the one that is 
relevant for our purposes is expertise in producing cogent moral arguments. If the reasoning is 
cogent, as is characteristic of a strongly justified argument, it should (in the absence of strong 
contrary arguments) be capable of persuading any reasonable citizen to act upon it, provided 
that she accepts the general principles on which it is based. But these are decisions that 
reasonable citizens must, generally speaking, take for themselves. This does not mean that the 
reasonable citizen is expected to have the philosophical training and acuity of the moral 
philosopher - expertise in normative ethics is, after all “a claim to command knowledge in 
respect of the making of normative judgments not commanded by others” (Archard 2011, p 
121). (Archard refers to “moral expertise” in the context of this passage, though from the 
preceding discussion it is clear he is referring to it in a sense similar to Weinstein.) What it 
does mean is that such individuals have the capacity for critical reflection on the ethical 
precepts offered by others as reasons for action, accepting those which cohere with the sense 
of reasonableness we have outlined above and rejecting those which, following Ronald 
Dworkin, rely upon prejudice, overwhelming emotional force, factual inaccuracy or 
unreflective conformity to received moral opinion (“parroting”) for their justification 
(Dworkin 1978, pp. 248-253).
9
 Using Weinstein’s scheme, we might understand the moral 
expertise of the reasonable citizen as “performative expertise in ethics” – i.e. “to live well” 
(1994 p 70) - such that she is responsive to the legitimate rights-claims of herself and others.
10
 
 
In one’s private life, of course, there may be exceptions to this – a person might feel too 
exhausted, or too emotionally involved, to trust himself to resolve a particular moral dilemma, 
and might defer to the judgment of someone he has good reason to trust. But these exceptions 
do not apply to persons who have been specifically entrusted with the task of taking difficult 
moral decisions on behalf some community. Moreover, moral expertise is quite different from 
expertise on the factual questions which decision-makers have to take into account. Most 
moral philosophers are laypeople in relation to medicine, and vice versa. So unless we want to 
entrust vital decisions to an elite of scientist-philosopher or medico-philosopher-kings – 
which, for reasons already given, we do not – we have to entrust them to people who, 
however good or even expert they are at moral reasoning, are laypeople in respect of the 
technical information on which they have to act. 
 
                                                 
9
 Founding the acceptability requirement along these lines also allays some of the concerns Driver raises about 
“borrowing moral knowledge” (2006 p 639) that could arise in relationships between two or more non-experts in 
ethics (e.g. a bigoted newspaper columnist and his uncritically devoted readership) as well as between an ethics 
expert and a non-expert. 
10
 Where we might depart from Weinstein is in his relativism towards the epistemology of the ‘good life’ 
(Weinstein 1994, p 71) – whilst we too would advocate a pluralist approach at the level of non-moral and 
morally permissible choices, the extent of this pluralism would be determined fundamentally by an egalitarian, 
liberal rights-based moral epistemology like the PGC. 
 The second kind of expertise to which we should be wary of according authority is what we 
may call hermeneutic expertise; that is expertise in interpreting texts, works of art, or human 
behaviour. An expert may help the citizen to understand a difficult poem, or a seemingly 
irrational piece of human behaviour, in a new light. (The analogy between art criticism and 
psychotherapy is also used by Habermas (1986, pp. 20-21).) But to achieve this understanding 
the citizen must understand why the expert’s interpretation makes sense. If she simply accepts 
that the poem or the behaviour must mean whatever the expert says it means, without 
knowing why, then she has understood nothing. Much psychiatric evidence is best considered 
as a form of hermeneutic expertise. (The locus classicus of the hermeneutic approach to 
psychiatry is Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology (1997, originally published in 1913).) 
 
One form of psychiatric – as well as philosophical - hermeneutic expertise is the attribution of 
mental states such as intention to individuals. To say that a person’s action was done, or 
words spoken, with a particular intention or motive is to interpret it in a certain way; to 
describe it in a way that ‘makes sense’ in the light of reasons for action that the agent is taken 
to have had (Anscombe 1963). Whether or not an expert’s account of a person’s action 
‘makes sense’ of it seems to us to be always a question that a reasonable citizen is competent 
to judge. It may be that the expert makes no sense of the action qua reasoned action, and 
instead explains it in purely causal terms, but in this case, the reasonable citizen can at least 
assess the senselessness of the action for himself. Even supposing that there is ‘one right 
answer’ to the question of what a person’s intentions or motives were, which could be 
determined by a precise knowledge of the sequence of neural events that led up to the act (this 
is a controversial view, and not one we endorse: see Hornsby 1993), such knowledge is not 
accessible even to the most expert observers. Given the epistemic elusiveness of past mental 
states, there is no reason for the reasonable citizen to take experts’ pronouncements about 
them as authoritative (Slobogin, 2000). 
 
The difficult question is where the line is to be drawn between ‘moral’ and ‘hermeneutic’ 
aspects of expert judgment on the one hand and ‘technical’ or pragmatic aspects on the other. 
This is particularly salient in the area of psychiatry, where psychiatric classification schemes 
(such as the DSM and ICD nosologies) are constituted by a problematic mix of scientific and 
value judgments (see, for a detailed discussion, Sadler 2005 and Cooper 2005). Whether or 
how a patient’s speech or behaviour ‘makes sense’, whether it is contrary to her interests and 
whether it manifests a condition that will respond to a particular kind of drug are respectively 
hermeneutic, moral and technical/pragmatic judgments but they may all be made together in a 
single diagnoses. One possible strategy is to adopt an integrated approach, which draws 
together the ‘technical domain’ and value judgments (deriving from all relevant perspectives 
on the decision) into the decision-making procedure. In the context of psychiatric ethics, for 
example, an integrated approach – values-based medicine - has been proposed by Bill Fulford 
(2004), who argues that decision-making in health care must “stand on two feet” – that of 
facts and that of values (Fulford, ibid., p 206). According to this approach, the “process” of 
reaching a decision (ibid., p 205) is crucial to investigate the “space of values” (ibid., pp. 221-
222) that are manifest within “evaluatively complex” (ibid., p 212) decision-making 
scenarios. We agree with Fulford that such a departure from “the traditional fact centred 
medical model” (ibid. p. 207 ff) is welcome and indeed necessary for a comprehensive 
understanding of decisions steeped in an array of facts and values. However, we would 
question how consistently this could be achieved when the criteria against which achieving “a 
 balance of legitimately different value perspectives [emphasis in original]” (Fulford ibid., p 
216) is not entirely clear and a vivid separation of facts and values may at times be difficult 
and perhaps impossible in some circumstances, such as in the diagnosis and treatment of 
personality disorders (for a discussion of the ethical as opposed to medical nature of a range 
of personality disorders, see Charland 2004). 
 
The capacity of non-experts to examine and critically evaluate the reasoning of experts is not 
confined to moral and hermeneutic expertise. As Deidre Dwyer argues, the basic norms of 
rational inference are common to different disciplines, so anyone who has grasped those 
principles has at least a “limited epistemic competence” to test the soundness of a chain of 
inferences drawn in any discipline (Dwyer, 2008). Dwyer also stresses the important point 
that expert evidence in litigation is usually only part of a larger evidential matrix, and the 
inferences drawn by an expert can be tested for their coherence with inferences drawn by 
other experts. Dwyer does not, however, seem to us to give sufficient weight to some of the 
severe limitations in the competence of a non-expert to assess many kinds of expert reasoning 
such as experts’ reliance on tacit knowledge and the accumulated learning of an expert 
community, and the inevitable selectivity of the data and background generalizations that 
form the basis of an expert’s judgment (although Dwyer does, however, discuss the last point: 
ibid., pp. 144-145). We are readier than Dwyer to accept that there are good epistemological 
(and not just ‘political’) (cf Dwyer ibid., p 312) reasons for decision-makers to defer to the 
theoretical authority of experts, but we stress that such deference leaves a great deal of 
cognitive and practical autonomy to the court or the citizen. 
 
In any case, it is unclear to what extent the human sciences, particularly in their applied forms 
such as psychiatry and social work discourse, can claim epistemic authority. The suspicion is 
that these disciplines (the double entendre is intentional) do not exemplify what Longino calls 
‘tempered equality’ of intellectual authority (Longino 2002, p 131). As Habermas insists, 
rational discourse is one in which all relevant points of view are taken into consideration 
(Habermas 1990, pp. 65-66),
 
so that mental health services users, for example, though not 
considered medical experts, are recognised as having knowledge derived from their own 
experience which is given respectful consideration in the formation of psychiatric knowledge. 
To what extent this is true of psychiatry today is not easy for an outsider to judge. (The 
importance of including the voice of service users in the formation of psychiatric knowledge 
is addressed in Bracken and Thomas (2005) and its contribution is also brought out vividly in 
Cresswell (2005).) If tribunals and other decision-makers accord too much deference to 
psychiatrists rather than listening to what their patients have to say, the result may be 
“epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2007), a failure to give due weight to people’s testimony on 
account of their status or the difficulty of understanding them. This is a further reason for 
treating psychiatric testimony, so far as possible, not as authoritative knowledge but as a form 
of hermeneutic expertise which can help decision-makers to understand the behaviour and 
testimony of those affected by their decisions. 
 
In the sort of situations that we are concerned with here, where any available course of action 
risks bringing about a prima facie rights violation and we are unavoidably making decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty, the use of a heuristic to evaluate the moral consequences of 
acting to protect one right where the other is invaded seems inevitable. In principle, this 
seems to lead to a straightforward distinction between the prediction of consequences and 
 their moral evaluation. In practice, under conditions of unavoidable uncertainty and with 
competing rights-claims in play, the picture is more complex. This leads us to our favoured 
approach to resolving these issues, which we elaborate in the next section. 
 
III. Competing Rights and Rights Precautionism 
Whether decision-makers are entitled to accept the experts’ testimony or advice as a basis for 
their decisions depends not only on epistemic factors but also on the moral issues at stake. In 
situations where accepting the erroneous advice of an expert would lead to the violation of a 
person’s rights, the level of confidence required (the standard of proof, in legal terms) will be 
high, and the graver the proposed rights violation the higher the standard. 
 
The choice a decision-maker faces may be one between a course of action which will violate a 
person’s right in the absence of some fact asserted by the expert and a course which, whether 
the expert is right or wrong, will violate no rights. Other cases, which we focus on in this 
article, involve a conflict of rights, either between two or more rights of the same person 
(which we will call an intra-agent conflict) or between the rights of two or more person 
(which we will call an inter-agent conflict), For example, where someone is said by an expert 
to be in a persistent vegetative state with no prospect of recovering consciousness, continuing 
to feed or care for that person will prima facie violate no-one’s rights, even if the expert is 
correct. On the other hand , withdrawing nutrition will, if the expert is wrong, constitute an 
extremely serious violation of the patient’s right to subsistence and ultimately to life. But if 
the patient has made an advance directive refusing feeding in the event of being in PVS, 
feeding him will, if the expert is correct, violate the patient’s right to self-determination, and 
we have an intra-agent (or, strictly speaking, an intra-possible-agent) conflict of rights. An 
example of an inter-agent conflict would be where some compulsory intervention is said to be 
necessary to protect others from serious harm by a mentally ill patient. We discuss similar 
examples to these in Section IV, but first we examine the general principle that we advocate 
in such cases, that of rights precautionism. 
 
When rights conflict, we must have regard to how important these rights are within the 
hierarchy determined by a substantive moral theory. As we argued above, the rights that must 
be respected in any legal order that all citizens could rationally accept are those entailed by 
the PGC. These can be understood as rights to the goods which are needs of agency 
(described above), and include both positive and negative rights, such as, for instance, the 
right to bodily and psychological integrity, the right not to be tortured and the right to 
education and healthcare (Gewirth 1978, pp. 54-58). These positive and negative rights can be 
ordered in a way that reflects their needfulness for the very possibility of action (Gewirth 
1982, pp. 55-56; Gewirth 1978, pp. 343-344). 
 
However, the likelihood of an action actually encroaching on one or more rights-claims also 
needs to be accounted for in deciding whether a particular action is permissible. Whereas the 
ranking of rights can be determined a priori, the weighting of risks depends upon specific 
contextual factors relevant to a particular case and takes place under conditions of uncertainty. 
Decisions of this kind must involve some form of weighing of the consequences for rights of 
alternative courses of action, in terms of what human rights law appropriately terms 
 ‘proportionality’. In the last analysis, this involves weighing incommensurables: as Beyleveld 
and Brownsword (2006 p. 148) and Beyleveld and Pattinson (2010 pp. 268-269) 
acknowledge, there is no formula that will tell us that an x per cent risk of violating a right to 
a basic good (i.e. one which is essential to the very possibility of successful agency (Gewirth, 
1982, pp. 55-56) outweighs a y per cent risk of violating a right to a non-subtractive good (i.e. 
one which preserves an individual’s existing possibilities for agency, such as sufficient 
information with which to make a choice relevant to her action, Gewirth, ibid., p 56). 
Moreover, the balance of risks will almost inevitably look different from the perspective of 
the expert and from that of the decision-maker. 
 
Despite the absence of uniquely ‘right answers’ to problems that involve prima facie rights 
violations no matter what course of action is taken, breaking the decision down into two 
elements – the relative importance of the rights at stake and the relative risks of violations of 
each right - is a potentially useful starting point for this heuristic. As outlined in Section I, we 
take the view that all prospective purposive agents, i.e. all those who are capable of 
prospectively valuing purposes and thus of self-consciously having reasons for action,
11
 have 
rights to the generic conditions of agency. However, it is not always clear whether a being or 
entity is an agent or not. We accept the philosophical problem of other minds and the 
theoretical possibility that one or other of the present authors (or you, the reader) is the only 
genuine human agent in a world of fiendishly clever simulacra contrived by some Cartesian 
demons (see Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, p 120, Beyleveld and Pattinson 2010, p 260; 
and Beyleveld 2012, pp. 9-10), but for practical purposes, the existence of other minds, and 
other agents, is a fairly straightforward instance of inference to the best explanation. Such an 
inference, of course, cannot afford an absolutely conclusive demonstration but it can provide 
a strong warrant for believing that another agent exists (and can warrant a rebuttable 
presumption of the non-existence of agency in machines, so long as any agent-like behaviour 
they display short of ‘apparent’ or ‘ostensible’ agency can be explained by their design or 
programming) (see Hyslop, 2010). In some cases the degree of probability that a being or 
entity is an ‘apparent’ or ‘ostensible’ agent truly is an agent may be less than typically 
warrants the inference. For practical purposes, then, ‘ostensible’ or ‘apparent’ agents must be 
treated as having rights, even if this rights attribution might be mistaken in some cases (see 
Beyleveld 2012, pp. 9-11).
12
 
 
To be an agent with rights does not necessarily equip one with the capacities required for full 
citizenship. We can draw the distinction between agents who can be assumed to have the 
required capacities and those who cannot in the following terms. The vast majority of adults 
possess a set of reasoning, behavioural and communicative capacities (much in excess of the 
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 In the words of Beyleveld and Pattinson (2010, p 270): “the list of generic rights holders includes every 
vulnerable being with the capacity to act (to do something voluntarily for a purpose that it treats as the reason for 
its behaviour)” but it is not the case that we thereby must “treat logically possible agents as agents” (ibid.), such 
as “rocks” (ibid., p. 263) – we can only treat as agents those beings and entitles who ostensibly behave as agents 
(ibid., p. 261). 
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 As Beyleveld argues (2012, pp. 9-11), only actual agents can have rights under the ‘will’ conception, i.e. rights 
that they can choose either to waive or to enforce; but beings that appear as if they may be agents (i.e. those 
whose evidence for agency is limited or has apparently extinguished) can have interests that others are under a 
duty to protect, and thus they have rights under the ‘interest’ conception (i.e. (“interest rights” as they uphold the 
important interests such beings or entities would have if they are or remain agents). (ibid.) 
 bare threshold required for agency) that allow them to participate meaningfully in the life of 
their society. Education, socialization and love, operating in conjunction with the usual stages 
of psychological development, are key to developing the capacities required fully to exercise 
one’s rights and to participate in civil and political life.13 We can think of adults having 
undergone such processes as agents of full societal competence (for a more detailed 
discussion of this point, see Bielby 2008, chapters 1 and 5). By contrast, other human beings 
either will temporarily, permanently or intermittently lack this competence whilst still 
retaining the capacity for agency. They may be considered ‘vulnerable’ in the sense that their 
restricted sphere of decisional competences places them at risk either of direct physical harm 
of long-term detriment to their development as societally competent agents. For example, 
children of primary school age have a right to education but do not yet have sufficient 
knowledge or decision-making capacity to decide whether to avail themselves of that right. 
Human beings with heightened vulnerabilities of a primarily cognitive nature, for example, 
adults with severe mental disorder or intellectual disability as well as young children, must, in 
an appropriate way and to a proportionate extent, receive the protections entailed by their 
having rights to protect them against suffering and wherever possible to nurture their own 
autonomy (see for further discussion of this point, Bielby, ibid. chapter 5). It would therefore 
be permissible - indeed, in many cases, obligatory - to treat them as societally incompetent 
agents and to restrict their participation in fundamental deliberative processes, as well as 
acting paternalistically to further their interests in ways they do not choose. This illustrates 
how the minimal threshold of agency - proactive purpose valuation - is far lower than that 
required for citizenship in this sense. So, whilst all agents possess rights under the ‘will’ 
conception, not all agents possess the decisional competence to exercise or waive all of their 
rights. Those who lack these citizenship capacities of course remain ‘citizens’ in a broader 
sense (being entitled to social welfare provisions, passports, etc.). Indeed, those with 
intermittent or partial capability for societal competence may be competent to participate in 
specific fora, e.g. as representatives on patient and children’s panels in health and social care 
provision. But these differences are irrelevant to why we should treat both those who possess 
and those who lack these citizenship capacities as agents. 
 
At the extreme, of course, agency itself may be questionable. Should medical experts 
convince us that the individual in question is brain-dead or irreversibly comatose, thereby 
lacking all capacity for agency, then in principle that individual, though still morally valuable, 
ceases to be a subject of rights - at least of the ‘will conception’ rights that can be enjoyed 
only by actual agents (Beyleveld 2012, p 11). As Beyleveld and Pattinson put it, “precaution 
requires agents to treat other beings as agents only if and to the extent that it is 
possible/meaningful to do so” (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2010, p. 262). The moral stakes 
involved in withholding ascriptions of agency, or failing to take seriously that its capacity 
may somehow be retained, are so high, however, that we may seriously question whether the 
requisite standard of proof that agency is lacking in such cases could be met at all.
14
 This is 
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 There is increasing neuroscientific evidence to support the claim that love makes a significant difference to a 
child’s ability to engage in healthy social interaction in later life, which is clearly and powerfully presented in 
Gerhardt 2004. For the case as to why children have a human rights claim to be loved, see Liao 2006. 
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 Especially in light of recent neuroscientific evidence that challenges assumptions about lack of awareness and 
intention in pvs and the minimally conscious state, chiefly Owen et al. 2006 and Owen and Coleman 2008. In 
the former study, which sought to ascertain an unconscious woman’s response to being invited to undertake 
imagining activities such as hitting a tennis ball after at least five months of being in a vegetative state, it was 
 because the consequence of error would be among the gravest moral wrongs: to treat an entity 
as a non-agent (and thus as a non-rights-holder) when the entity actually possesses the 
capacity for agency, however dormant - and where to treat that entity as an agent would not 
undermine the agency rights of others who, on the evidence, are more probably agents 
(Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000, p 42). It is on this precautionary ground of attaching moral 
weight to evidence of agency, rather than by virtue of mere species membership, that beings 
or entities merit being treated as subjects of rights. 
 
To be clear, the rights precautionism approach adopted here is not the same as the currently 
dominant ‘precautionary principle’ as used in environmental and biotechnology regulation, 
but rather has a determinate moral content influenced by Gewirthian rights theory. (For a 
critical discussion of the precautionary principle in the former context, see Feintuck (2005) 
and in the latter, see Engelhardt and Jotterand (2004).) As already indicated, our thinking 
about precaution follows similar lines to Beyleveld, Brownsword and Pattinson, the first two 
of whom have pointed recently to the criminal standard of proof as an example of 
precautionary reasoning in law (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2009, esp. pp. 183-185). The 
criminal standard of proof rests on the right of every person not to be punished for acts of 
which they are in fact innocent (Dworkin 1985). Because punishing an innocent person would 
violate that right, whereas not punishing them would not directly violate anyone’s rights 
(though it might place others at risk of having their rights violated), the presumption of 
innocence requires that they be treated as belonging to the class who enjoy the right not to be 
punished unless the contrary is proved to a very high degree of probability – in an old phrase, 
to the level of ‘moral certainty’ (Shaprio 1986). 
 
An important feature of standard of proof rules is that they do not allow a consequentialist 
balancing of risks on a case-by-case basis. For example, faced with a strong but not 
conclusive case against an alleged serial killer, it might be reasonable to think that the 
probability that if he is set free and is guilty, he will kill again, outweighs the risk of 
imprisoning an innocent man. To allow such discretion (or at least to allow it overtly – there 
is no guarantee that juries will not in fact reason in this way) would, given the inevitable 
pressures on decision-makers to err on the side of public protection, erode the presumption of 
innocence to the point of destruction. The benefits of a uniform rule in protecting the innocent 
outweigh the seriously suboptimal consequences of applying the rule in a small number of 
cases. Similarly in the family courts, the facts relied upon to establish that a child is likely to 
suffer significant harm must be proved on the balance of probabilities, without taking account 
of the degree or risk or the gravity of the harm to which the child will be exposed if the 
allegations are true (Re B (Children: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11). 
This leads to a suboptimal allocation of risk in some cases, but is deemed necessary “to 
protect both the children and their parents from unjustified intervention in their lives” (ibid., 
para. [54] (Baroness Hale)). Of course, since a substantive moral theory determines the 
importance that attaches to the competing rights, other controversial cases would invite a 
range of different responses. In the next section, we will explore our approach towards 
                                                                                                                                                        
concluded “her decision to cooperate with the authors by imagining particular tasks when asked to do so 
represents a clear act of intention, which confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously aware of herself 
and her surroundings” (Owen et al. 2006, p. 1402). 
 weighing rights in the context of expert judgments about compulsory psychiatric 
hospitalisation and refusal of psychiatric treatment. 
 
Rights-precautionary reasoning in one sense involves a “rights-consequentialist” or 
“deontological consequentialist” approach, in which the process of deciding upon the right 
action in any context requires us to take account of the consequences of choices available to 
us in that context for respecting the rights of agents (see Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, p 
184, n 19 and Gewirth 1978, p 216). On one level, it is a form of rule-consequentialism, 
though not of rule-utilitarianism,
15
 since the undesirable outcomes to be avoided are identified 
by a rights-based moral theory and act as ‘trumps’ over any merely utilitarian reason for 
decision (Dworkin 1981). (A more difficult question, which we need not pursue here, is 
whether rights always ‘trump’ non-rights-based moral reasons.) As such, our approach to 
rights precautionism would reject the optionality of rights which remains open under standard 
consequentialist accounts. The rules must, however, themselves conform to a principle of 
proportionality. The risk of morally undesirable decisions resulting from the application of the 
rule must be proportionate to the risk of undesirable decisions that would result from allowing 
decision-makers greater discretion. 
 
On these grounds, it seems possible to justify the following general principles regarding 
standards of proof: 
I. Where it is foreseeable that in the great majority of cases the undesirable 
consequences of wrongly finding a fact proved will greatly outweigh the 
consequences of not finding it proved when it is in fact true, and where allowing 
decision-makers to weigh the risk of error in particular cases carries a high risk that 
they will reach unjustified decisions, a ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof 
should be required; 
II. Where it is foreseeable that in the great majority of cases the undesirable 
consequences of an error in either direction are of approximately equal gravity, and 
where allowing decision-makers to weigh the risk of error in particular cases carries a 
high risk that they will reach unjustified decisions, proof on the balance of 
probabilities should be required; 
III. Where the relatively gravity of the consequences of different errors varies greatly 
between different cases, decision-makers should be permitted to take account of the 
relative consequences of different errors in each case, provided that procedures can be 
designed that will result in fewer undesirable decisions, or less gravely undesirable 
decisions, than adherence to a uniform standard of proof. 
 
The really difficult question, however, is what to do about types of case where the 
consequences of error are very variable and there is no procedure that will allow wide 
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 It is important to stress that in endorsing this claim we are not espousing a position in consequentialist ethics, 
where the salience or even the mere existence of a right would depend upon its ability to secure a non-moral end 
(e.g. welfare, happiness, economic efficiency etc., see, e.g. Talbott, 2005). In our view, the moral worth of the 
rights to freedom and well-being does not depend on the perceived value of the goal to be pursued. Rather, 
where rights conflict, we agree with Beyleveld and Brownsword that these rights need to be weighed against one 
another in terms of their relative importance for the possibility of successful action qualified by the greater or 
lesser probability of their being wrongly denied in contexts where prima facie violation is inevitable. See 
Beyleveld and Brownsword (2006 p. 148). 
 discretion in particular cases without producing a high risk of morally undesirable decisions. 
Unfortunately, this is precisely the situation that obtains in many mental health (and child 
care) decisions. On the one hand, it is impossible to generalize about whether the 
consequences of compulsorily detaining or treating somebody (or removing a child from its 
family) are more or less serious than the consequences of not doing so, because the 
consequences vary so greatly from one case to another. On the other hand, particularly in 
mental health cases,
16
 the pressures on decision-makers to avoid decisions that result in a 
mentally ill person harming someone else are much greater than the pressure to avoid 
unnecessary detention or compulsion, so that unless decision-makers are remarkably virtuous, 
any system that allows them broad discretion will almost inevitably result in injustice. (Then 
again, given the balance of pressures on legislators, any rule-based system is very likely to be 
unjust as well.) 
 
Supposing, however, that decision-makers are sufficiently virtuous to do justice in such 
situations, they could rationally accept the following Principle of Rights Precautionism, 
which develops Beyleveld, Brownsword and Pattinson’s formulation of precautionary 
reasoning, especially their “Criterion of Avoidance of More Probable Harm” (see Beyleveld 
and Pattinson 1998 (unpublished paper, on file with PB) and Beyleveld and Brownsword 
2001, p 123 as well as the discussion in Bielby 2008, pp. 103-105.): 
 
The justification of any course of action or inaction in a case that involves the unavoidable 
prima facie violation of rights hinges upon: 
 
i. the relative importance of the rights at stake; 
ii. the strength of the evidence available to suggest that one or more of these 
rights would be violated were a certain course of action or inaction taken;  
iii. ensuring that the person(s) whose rights are affected has been given a fair 
opportunity to challenge that assessment, either on their own behalf if they 
have the mental capacity to do so or, if not, through an advocate or proxy; 
iv. the relative severity of the consequences false positive and false negative 
judgments as to the existence of sufficient grounds for infringing a right. 
 
Thus, to satisfy the moral acceptability criterion of our principle of rational acceptability 
outlined in section I, and the cognitive accessibility criterion outlined in section II, one should 
respond in such situations in a way that minimizes the negative consequences of the possible 
rights violations, determined by the relative weight of the rights of the individual(s) so 
affected and the probability of violations actually occurring should one option be chosen over 
another (including the probability of the consequences of error), informed by the most 
comprehensive expert information available at the relevant time. 
 
                                                 
16
 In family cases the pressures are more evenly balanced: hence the saying that social workers are ‘damned if 
they do and damned if they don’t’. 
 IV. Applications in mental health and capacity law 
To illustrate the points made so far, let us consider two examples: the example of judging 
capacity and the example of involuntary detention and treatment for mental disorder.
17
 We 
will approach these through the fictional cases of Emma and Paul. 
 
Clearly, on our theory there would be no question of the mentally ill not having rights, and the 
particular ‘heightened vulnerabilities’ of this group would require us to reflect on how to 
respect their rights when their capacities for exercising these might be significantly impaired 
(for discussion, see Cavadino 1997, Matthews 2000 and Bielby, 2008). In cases like these, 
then, we have an ‘intra-agent’ conflict of rights (i.e. between the bundle of rights that agents 
have) that requires ethical resolution: the negative right not to be detained and medicated 
against one’s will and the positive right the person has to receive the support of others (that 
includes mental health professionals) to experience good mental health (and by this we mean 
rights which are also engaged outside of the psychiatric context). In certain circumstances, the 
above rights need to be further weighed against ‘inter-agent’ rights (i.e. the rights other agents 
have against the agent in question). Most obvious in this context is the right of other members 
of the public to be protected from unintended harm that may arise were the person with 
mental illness not to be so detained. However, this also may engage both an intra-agent as 
well as an inter-agent right justified by the mentally ill person’s own interest that she has in 
being restrained from engaging in such action when this is a product of her disorder which 
compromises her capacity for responsibility. 
 
Though the ethics of compulsory psychiatric hospitalisation has been debated widely (e.g. 
Chodoff 1976, Culver and Gert 1981 and Szasz, 1997), the role of expert and lay influences 
on decision-making in such contexts has been rarely discussed. In one of the few papers that 
considers this question explicitly, Stephen Morse claims: 
 
“The use of experts encourages courts, legislatures, and legal decisionmakers to avoid 
the hard social, moral, and legal questions posed by mental health laws by responding 
as if there were scientific answers to them . . . laypersons are perfectly competent both 
to provide most of the observational data necessary for mental health decisions and to 
make such decisions.” (Morse 1978, pp. 602-603) 
 
We share Morse’s objections to unduly technocratic approaches to decision-making, which 
tend towards giving experts broad discretion, in making difficult choices about rights 
invasions in psychiatry. However, Morse’s failure to develop a perspective on which, if any, 
layperson’s perspective should be prioritized over another deprives his account of a deeper 
normative resonance. Indeed, his approach seems to proceed from little more than intuition: 
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 There are other possible examples, different from these, in which an expert might be called upon to provide 
evidence to support the decision of a legal decision-maker, such as where a patient’s best interests need to be 
determined in end of life cases, e.g. whether life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn and withheld for an 
adult in a minimally conscious state (W (by her litigation friend, B) v M (by her litigation friend, the Official 
Solicitor) and others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam)) and provision of coercive feeding for an adult with anorexia 
nervosa (A Local Authority v E (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) and others [2012] EWHC 1639 
(CoP)). For reasons of space, these cannot be addressed here, suffice to say that we do not envisage any 
difficulties in applying the principle of rights precautionism outlined to cases such as these. 
  
“Using lay as well as expert testimony about the actor's behavior, the decisionmaker 
can then decide if the person is sufficiently crazy to be an appropriate candidate for 
the application of mental health laws. If the factfinder's response to the behavioral data 
it hears is "so what," then the actor probably does not meet the legal criterion of 
mental disorder; if the response is "that's crazy" or "he's crazy," then the criterion of 
mental abnormality may be met.” (Morse ibid., pp. 612-613) 
 
We find this approach unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the absence of an ethical 
framework to guide decision-making other than intuition is very likely to lead to 
inconsistencies and a lack of transparency in the decision-making process. It is also not clear 
why intuition should represent a more attractive approach than one grounded in a moral 
theory capable of rational acceptance, such as that we outlined in Section I. Second, despite 
Morse’s keenness to reduce the significance attached to expert testimony in making such 
decisions (with which we are, of course, sympathetic), his approach does not make clear 
whether lay interpretations of the mentally ill persons’ behaviour are always the standard by 
which the rightness of any subsequent action should be judged, including those which may 
infringe the mentally ill person’s rights. As stated, Morse’s account could be used to justify 
the primacy of the citizen’s perspective only where the fact-finder or decision-maker sees fit; 
in other cases, especially where the decision-maker is a specialist (e.g. a psychiatrist or a 
judge) or the body making legal decisions is comprised of specialists alone (e.g. a review 
tribunal), the citizen’s perspective could be taken into account only to be set aside when 
reaching a verdict. This possibility appears to be left open by Morse when he later goes on to 
claim “[w]hether a person cannot or will not think straight or control himself is a moral and 
commonsense judgment that should be made by the legal decisionmaker”. (Morse, ibid, p 
618) We do not think that ‘commonsense judgments’ (if such a phenomenon exists) can be 
used as a synonym for the perspective of public justification that is rationally acceptable. 
 
If previous approaches bear little resemblance to our own framework, when would psychiatric 
detention be a justifiable infringement rather than a violation of someone’s rights under rights 
precautionism? In our view, the following stages would need to be satisfied. First, the rights 
that would prima facie be violated as a result of the decision to detain or not detain would 
need to be identified and taken into account. Commonly, this would amount to one’s rights to 
freedom of movement and association, along with the right not to be subject to personality-
affecting psychoactive medication against one’s will, the latter which is best understood as a 
species of the more widely known right against torture.
18
 Second, there would need to be 
sufficient expert evidence to support the claim that the person in question is suffering from a 
mental illness of such a degree as to warrant the judgment that they were incapable of making 
competent decisions about their own treatment, and/or were posing a substantial risk of harm 
to themselves or to others.
19
 It is in this respect that evidence is most likely to be presented in 
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 Which could engage Articles 5, 11 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights respectively, subject 
to the provision in Article 5(e), which allows “the lawful detention  . . . of persons of unsound mind”. The 
seminal case on the application of this provision is Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979-80) 2 EHRR 387. 
19
 This is broadly in line with the position contained in the recommendations proposed by the Expert Committee 
established to consider reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 in England and Wales (the ‘Richardson 
Committee’), which were not accepted by the British Government following publication of its report in 1999. 
See UK Department of Health (1999). 
 the specialized language of psychiatry: nosological classifications, case histories, prescribed 
medications and recommended treatments. As discussed in section II, some of the more 
‘technical’ aspects of psychiatric knowledge, for example about appropriate medication and 
how it should be administered, may need to be treated as authoritative for practical purposes 
here, after both the scientific and ethical aspects of the knowledge have been tested by 
appropriate procedures that allow for dissenting voices to be heard. However, we would need 
a critical awareness of how descriptive explanations of syndromes in psychiatric judgments 
are intertwined with normative judgments about ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ behaviour in order to 
avoid the ambiguity identified by Weisstub that “it is often unclear, when psychiatric 
evidence is used, whether the role of psychiatry is merely factual rather than constituting the 
substance of the standard” (Weisstub 1978, p 45). 
 
Third - and this goes to the heart of rights precautionism - the moral significance of the rights 
identified at the first stage and the consequences of erring either way would need to be 
considered. To illustrate how this stage might be addressed, let us consider two hypothetical 
scenarios that involve some degree of risk for rights flowing from a false positive and false 
negative decision. The first concerns the potential of harm to self only, and the second 
potential of harm to others as well as oneself. 
 
(i) The case of Emma 
Emma, a middle-aged woman, has suffered from severe depression for some time. Having 
been detained under mental health legislation, she is subject to a course of electro-convulsive 
therapy (ECT) for her mental disorder against her will in the belief that it is clinically 
indicated and that she lacks the competence to consent to or refuse treatment.
20
 (Under current 
English mental health law, a patient who “is capable of understanding the nature, purpose and 
likely effects of the treatment” can normally consent to or refuse ECT, unless in an 
emergency (Mental Health Act 1983 s. 58A(3)(c) and s. 62.)).
21
 On subsequent reassessment, 
Emma’s refusal is found to be the product of competent decision-making. The use of ECT is 
discontinued and she is returned to standard (less efficacious) antidepressant medication. A 
few months later, her healthcare treatment team proposed that a course of novel 
antidepressant medication is used instead, to which Emma agrees, and which proves 
beneficial. Over time, this makes Emma well enough to undergo psychotherapy, which 
eventually leads to her being discharged from the hospital. However, the trauma induced by 
the experience of coercive ECT causes Emma to become particularly distrustful of 
psychiatrists, and her recovery, though ultimately still achieved, is delayed. 
                                                 
20
 Let us assume that the legislation allowing for the compulsory detention and treatment of persons with mental 
disorder was made in accordance with principles of human rights (and that in certain circumstances ECT may be 
clinically justified, Emma’s being one such case) which we think is a viable assumption provided the legislation 
is founded on patient-centred grounds and subject to rigorous procedural safeguards. For a discussion of how 
human rights principles can be used to shape mental health law, see Gostin 2001. 
21
 The wording of the decisional competence requirement in relation to ECT under s.58A(3)(c) reflects the 
'understanding limb' of the pre-MCA common law test for mental capacity set out in Re C (adult: refusal of 
medical; treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819, although para. 23.28 of the 2008 revision to the Mental Health Act 
1983 Code of Practice states, "[f]or people aged 16 or over, capacity to consent is defined by the MCA" (UK 
Department of Health, 2008, p. 186). Later, in a footnote to para. 24.7, it is stated explicitly "in sections 58 and 
58A, the Act refers to the patient being "capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects" of the 
treatment. However, for all practical purposes this can be understood to mean the same as the test of whether the 
patient has the capacity to consent (or, if under 16, the competence to do so)" (ibid. p 201). 
  
(ii) The case of Paul 
Paul, a quiet and gentle young man, has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. His 
delusions cause him to believe that those in control of the IT systems at his former workplace 
are sending emails encouraging his former colleagues to persecute and harm him. Since Paul 
retains some insight into his condition and is compliant, his consultant psychiatrist initially 
recommends anti-psychotic medication outside of hospital, rather than compulsory treatment. 
However, this generally suppresses rather than dispels the delusion. One day, Paul returns to 
his former workplace and confronts the Head of IT, who he accuses of masterminding a hate 
campaign against him. Paul becomes agitated though not physically aggressive and is led 
away from the premises by security staff. There are no witnesses to the altercation, but the 
employee reports that he felt physically threatened by Paul’s conduct. When being questioned 
by police, Paul denies any intention to harm anyone, states he does not wish to return and 
claims he just wants the persecution to stop. As it happens, Paul never had such an intention. 
However, the decision is taken to detain him for assessment under mental health legislation 
on grounds of potential harm to others. 
 
From the perspective of rights precautionism, is the error of the initial competence assessment 
which led to the coercive ECT in Emma’s case more or less significant than the error of 
believing that Paul presents harm to others when he does not? In Emma’s case, the competing 
rights in play are her right to be free from unwilled interventions into her psychological and 
physical integrity and her right to be helped to experience good mental health. In Paul’s case, 
the competing rights are Paul’s to have his treatment managed in circumstances which present 
the fewest restrictions on his freedom and the right others have against Paul that he does not 
violate (or threaten to violate) their physical integrity. However, the judgment that Emma was 
incompetent to consent to a treatment she would otherwise have the right to refuse (in English 
mental health legislation, at least) and that Paul presented such a risk were in both cases 
erroneous. Let us suppose that had the error in each case not been made, Emma would have 
had her refusal of ECT respected and her subsequent trauma would very likely not have 
arisen. Paul would have continued with consensual medication outside of hospital, and 
honoured his pledge not to return to his former workplace. In order to make our conclusions 
less obvious, let us further suppose that despite the error and the consequent implications for 
the rights of both Emma and Paul respectively, the decision-makers in each case took steps to 
establish and evaluate relevant information before arriving at their decision, presenting it in a 
way that would be rationally acceptable. These steps would clearly diminish the procedural 
shortcomings of the decision in ethical terms. 
 
Nevertheless, in each case it remains that a significant right held by Emma and Paul (on our 
rational acceptability argument) was overridden. Let us now look to the consequences of 
deciding the other way. Were it possible to be sure of Emma’s competence and that Paul 
would remain non-threatening and compliant with treatment, then there would be no question 
that the decisions in both cases were wrong. The problem arises because we cannot know this 
– it is possible that Emma could have indeed been incompetent all along, in which case 
allowing a putatively competent refusal could have been detrimental to her treatment (and 
thus to her right to be helped to achieve mental health), especially had the novel treatment not 
become available. Equally, Paul could have been prepared to lie about his true intentions and, 
 were he not detained for assessment and possible treatment, return to his former workplace to 
commit a violent attack on the employee. 
 
At the level of probability, on one level it seems there is little to distinguish Emma’s actually 
being incompetent from Paul’s actually posing a threat of harm to others. At most, we might 
only be able to rely upon the existence of reliable empirical data in both contexts to establish 
the likelihood of competence in severely depressed patients when incompetence has been 
found or the likelihood of ‘dangerousness’22 in an apparently compliant patient with some 
insight into their illness. However, in English mental health law, at least, compulsory 
hospitalisation and treatment is not subject to a test of ‘impaired decision-making capacity’ or 
‘considerable risk of serious harm to others or self’, along the lines of that which has been 
proposed by commentators arguing for reform (see, e.g. Doyal and Sheather 2005, Dawson 
and Szmukler 2006, and Richardson 2007). It is therefore possible to detain Paul, at least 
temporarily, on a weaker standard of suffering from a mental disorder “of a nature or degree 
which warrants . . . detention . . . in a hospital for assessment (or for assessment followed by 
medical treatment) . . . in the interests of his own health or safety or with a view to the 
protection of other persons” (Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended by the Mental Health Act 
2007), s.2(2)a-b). We will return to this point shortly. It will usually remain the case, though, 
if the empirical evidence gleaned is itself inconclusive, or if no such studies exist, we then 
need to turn to the remaining variable: the significance of the possible harm. 
 
In the first case, Emma’s ‘inter-agent’ rights to be free from unwanted psychological and 
physical interference might be thought to be quite finely balanced against her right to be 
helped to achieve mental well-being – both are, after all, a manifestation of the negative and 
positive fundamental rights to psychological well-being, which are a precondition of effective 
agency (see Gewirth 1982, pp. 55-56). Though the rights denied by the decision were 
significant and the consequences for her of being coerced into treatment distressing, we need 
to weigh these against the implications for Emma’s positive right in mental health which 
would have been violated had a ‘false positive’ decision of competence been reached. While 
Emma’s case involves a difficult balance of rights, it involves a relatively simple question of 
fact: does she have mental capacity to decide whether to consent to ECT, as defined by the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (hereafter MCA)? What is involved is essentially an interpretation 
of what Emma says about her refusal and the reasons (if any) for it. We suggested above that 
in such questions of interpretation, decision makers should not simply defer to expert opinion 
but should seek to understand the person’s words and actions for themselves, taking account 
of the expert’s views.23 
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 The assessment of ‘dangerousness’ as a suitable aim for psychiatric prediction is questioned by Grisso and 
Appelbaum (1997, p. 457, n. 3). This would appear to be connected with anxiety over psychiatry involving itself 
in making value judgments rather than confining itself to ‘scientific’ descriptions of probable behaviour. We 
expect that their anxieties would also extend to the often inter-changeable use of the term ‘harm’. We do not see 
a problem with the prediction of either ‘dangerousness’ or ‘harm’, provided it is judged in accordance with a 
theory of human rights capable of rational acceptance as set out in this article. This then makes a definition of 
‘dangerousness’ or ‘harm’ less contentious: in our view, it can be understood as unjustifiable detrimental 
consequences for interests other agents have in freedom and well-being. In this sense, our understanding of harm 
is close to that of Feinberg (1986), who understands it as “wrongly to set back interests” [emphasis in original] 
(ibid., p. 11). 
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 Bersoff also shares this view, questioning the justifiability of deferring to psychiatric experts in legal decision-
making: “The psychiatric and psychological components of decisions affecting the rights of mentally disabled 
  
Emma’s case appears to involve a scenario where an error either way will be of comparable 
seriousness: on the one hand, detrimental consequences would follow from the false negative 
denial of competence whereas wrongly deeming her to be competent to refuse ECT would 
involve continuing violations to her right to mental health. This suggests that a decision-
maker ethically need only be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Emma is incompetent 
– which reflects the current English legal position under s.5(1-2) of the MCA. If after making 
all reasonable enquiries the decision-maker is satisfied that Emma is incompetent, an 
infringement of her right to physical and psychological integrity might appear to be justified 
as a way of helping her to secure her equally important (and closely related) right to good 
mental health. 
 
But matters are not quite as simple as that. Even if the balance of probabilities tips marginally 
towards incompetence, there remains a significant risk that Emma’s competent refusal is 
being overridden; and even if Emma is truly incompetent, in English law, her wishes remain a 
factor that can properly be taken into account in assessing whether ECT is an “appropriate” 
treatment.
24
 If the benefits of ECT are uncertain in relation to the side-effects or only 
marginally superior to alternative treatments, the invasion of her bodily integrity by 
compulsory treatment might be unjustified even though she was probably incompetent to 
refuse. Conversely, if there is evidence which suggests that on balance Emma may be 
competent, but this is short of clear evidence to support such a judgment, and it is plain that 
the treatment would be enormously beneficial and her prognosis without it extremely bleak, it 
might be justifiable to reach a judgment of incompetence and override her refusal if the 
consequences of doing so would be less serious than reaching a ‘false positive’ finding of 
competence. 
 
A relevant factor in resolving the dilemma is the consequence for the patient of the decision 
over time – here, but for the emergence of the novel treatment which could not have been 
foreseen, Emma could have remained for a much more extensive time in psychiatric care 
awaiting recovery to the point where she could meaningfully undergo psychotherapy – 
justified perhaps if we could be clear that she has the competence to refuse but not, if as was 
suspected, she had not. Since the investigation of Emma’s competence was not procedurally 
deficient – and we think a ‘reasonable belief’ of a lack of competence is a morally sound 
principle from the perspective of rational acceptability to absolve mistake - then we can say 
that Emma’s rights here were infringed but not violated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
persons are not so proportionately great nor is the ability of mental health professionals to arrive at accurate 
judgments so demonstrable, that their expertise should dominate all other considerations” (Bersoff 1992, p 371). 
Yet, as Donnelly highlights, under English law, there is evidence of deference by the courts towards 
professionals (such as psychiatrists and psychologists) who assess capacity, including giving only brief reasons 
for endorsing the medical professional’s judgment of incapacity (Donnelly 2009, pp. 469-470) and where 
competing evidence arises, often expressing a preference for that provided by “independent experts” above those 
familiar with the patient in question (ibid. p 470). 
24
 See the 2008 revision to the Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice (UK Department of Health 2008, para. 
24.58), which states that the second opinion appointed doctor (SOAD) should, inter alia, “give due weight to the 
patient’s views, including any objection to the proposed treatment and any preference for an alternative” (ibid., p 
212). 
 In the second case, it seems that Paul’s ‘intra-agent’ right to be helped to full mental health 
(which he has shown to value through consenting to treatment outside of hospital) is being 
overshadowed by an undue emphasis placed upon ‘inter-agent’ rights, given the facts known. 
This is facilitated by the discretion afforded to mental health professions (in England and 
Wales as in other many other jurisdictions) to detain on the grounds of potential of causing 
harm to others. Where the risk of harm to others is real and the type of harm threatened is 
morally significant (e.g. serious physical harm rather than, say, harm to property), the rights 
precautionary ground for overriding liberty rights temporarily (albeit on a clearly articulated 
and reviewable basis) for the sake of upholding rights against physical attack – and 
sometimes the right to life – is decisive. The proviso is that the right infringed (e.g. liberty) 
should be justified by the risks presented to more important rights of other agents (e.g. to their 
bodily integrity and life) (see further on this point, Bielby 2008, p. 200). In addition, it is 
possible that psychiatric detention on the grounds of harm to others could be further justified 
with reference to the principle set out at the beginning of this section that one has a right to be 
prevented from causing harm to others for which one could not be held responsible. As 
Monahan and Wexler argue, provided we understand the prediction of dangerousness as a 
statement of probability, “rather than an absolute claim that violent behaviour will occur” 
(Monahan and Wexler 1978, p 38), then even the highest standard of proof available - beyond 
a reasonable doubt – may be satisfied on these terms (ibid.). This means that, notwithstanding 
the severity of the limitations placed on the rights of the patient detained, detention of a 
person with a mental disorder whose behaviour presents a demonstrable risk to the basic 
rights of other agents is justifiable on a balance of probabilities standard of proof. 
 
However, in Paul’s case there are compelling grounds for doubt as to whether he poses a risk 
of harm to others on the balance of probabilities, despite his delusions and behaviour at his 
former workplace. Since Paul’s ‘intra-agent’ rights are unlikely to be advanced in the hospital 
setting, and he retains some insight into his condition, we can conclude that the decision to 
prima facie violate his liberty rights can only be shown to be a justifiable infringement if the 
threat that he poses to other agents is real. From the perspective of rational acceptability, we 
doubt that it could be shown. First, there is no compelling evidence that Paul is causing a risk 
of harm to others – despite the remark made by the employee that he found Paul’s agitated 
behaviour to be threatening. Second, it is not clear what assessment would achieve in terms of 
the rights at stake in the scenario – if the risk of harm to others Paul presents is low, and his 
treatment has been provided with reasonable success outside of hospital, then it is likely he 
would be discharged swiftly in any event. Third, there is a risk that the experience may cause 
Paul to feel stigmatized, and like Emma, to erode his trust in the psychiatric profession, thus 
hampering his recovery. Though rights precautionism could readily conceive of situations 
where a patient should be detained on grounds of the potential to cause serious harm to others 
– à la the Richardson recommendations - Paul’s actions or intentions would have had to pose 
a more palpable threat than they were here for that criterion to be met. 
 
What both these cases tell us is that the particular vulnerabilities faced by people with mental 
health problems, both cognitive and circumstantial, should encourage us to reflect upon how 
acts that affect their rights can leave them especially open to further psychological harm. This 
is consistent with acknowledging that there needs to be a sensitive appreciation of the 
consequences for all rights holders concerned of deciding one way or the other. Such insights 
need not lead us to ignore the practical constraints on the decision makers but to ensure the 
 rights at stake in the decision are interpreted with due regard to the plight of especially 
vulnerable citizens. In terms of decision-making about competence to refuse treatment and 
compulsory hospitalization , this may mean taking urgent decisions that are believed to 
accord with the perspective of the reasonable citizen and then having them retrospectively 
scrutinized, where this represents the earliest opportunity for the grounds of the decision to be 
assessed. Already, through the system of mental health review tribunals, mental health experts 
can offer persuasive testimony when a decision is challenged that might lead to the decision 
ceasing to have effect. However, our account would go further insofar as it would favour 
greater lay and service user participation in review tribunals and in ethics committees at 
psychiatric hospitals. The opportunities offered by such approaches are topics for future 
research but should be taken very seriously if we are not, as Bartlett and Sandland warn, “to 
treat mental health law as a set of academic constructs, and ignore the people contained within 
the system” (Bartlett and Sandland 2007 p 31). 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have argued that a normative principle of public justification with a moral 
acceptability and cognitive accessibility limb which we have called ‘rational acceptability’ 
would support a theoretical account of human rights and a heuristic for resolving conflicts of 
rights under conditions of uncertainty - ‘rights precautionism’. This builds upon the work of 
Alan Gewirth and Gewirthian legal philosophers Deryck Beyleveld, Roger Brownsword and 
Shaun Pattinson, although we have argued that Gewirthian rights theory also can be supported 
from a contractualist position. Following this approach, we have argued that it is from the 
perspective of rational acceptability that assessments of expert evidence should be made that 
inform decisions that involve prima facie rights violations. This approach divides 
responsibilities between experts and the representatives of the citizenry in a way that does not 
lead either into technocracy or to a ‘decisionist model’ which sees the non-expert as making 
essentially arbitrary or non-rational choices between values.
25
 The official decision-maker 
will sometimes be dependent on experts for information bearing on the question of whose 
rights are affected by a decision (e.g. the psychiatric patient alone or members of the public as 
well) and, more often, for information bearing on the assessment of the risks of prima facie 
rights-violations flowing from various alternative courses of action (e.g. to what extent, if at 
all, does a person diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia present a genuine risk of harm to 
others or herself and will this risk be minimized if she is deprived of her liberty and subjected 
to compulsory treatment?). However, the fundamental normative question of weighing rights 
is to be judged from the perspective of rational acceptability (e.g. whether the degree of risk 
posed is too low to justify compulsory detention and treatment). 
 
On this account, on the one hand, the weighing of such alternative consequences is not 
arbitrary, since as we have seen, there are good reasons to regard some rights as more 
fundamental than others, and thus possible violations of these rights can be viewed in 
proportion to their importance and the likelihood of their occurrence (Beyleveld and 
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 On technocratic and decisionist models of the relations between politics and scientific expertise, see Jürgen 
Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: student protest, science and politics (trans. J.J. Shapiro, London: 
Heinemann, 1971) pp. 61-66. 
 Brownsword 2006, p. 148). Neither, on the other hand, are the weights in question susceptible 
to any precise quantification (Beyleveld and Brownsword, ibid and Beyleveld and Pattinson 
2010, pp. 268-269): no amount of expert knowledge can tell us definitely, for example, 
whether an individual will go on to cause serious harm to others or herself if she is not 
compulsorily detained and treated. People with certain kinds of expertise, such as 
psychiatrists, medical ethicists and lawyers, may be better able than most citizens to formulate 
cogent arguments on these questions; but the acceptance or rejection of these arguments, 
unlike that of some kinds of scientific or medical judgment, must depend ultimately on their 
rational acceptability in accordance with the moral and epistemological criteria we have 
presented here. Through bringing these criteria together in a framework of rights 
precautionism, and by illustrating its application to two fictional mental health/capacity law 
cases, a potentially useful heuristic emerges which can justify an ethically sound resolution to 
such cases, given the inevitable conditions of uncertainty in which it is applied. Clearly, this 
points to further work to be done beyond the groundwork we have laid here, and so we must 
leave the more practical question of how such a model may be implemented, and the 
challenges it may face, for another day. 
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